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Institutional investors and the QE portfolio balance channel 
 
Abstract 
The operation of the portfolio balance channel has been emphasized by monetary policy makers 
as a key channel through which quantitative easing (QE) policies work.  We assess whether the 
investment behavior of insurance companies and pension funds in the United Kingdom during 
the global financial crisis was consistent with such an effect by analyzing both sectoral and 
institution-level data.  Our results suggest QE led to institutional investors shifting their 
portfolios away from government bonds towards corporate bonds, but did not lead to a shift into 
equities. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In response to the 2007/2008 global financial crisis and subsequent global economic recession, 
central banks in the advanced economies adopted a variety of standard and non-standard 
measures to ease monetary conditions. The centerpiece of these non-standard monetary measures 
has been large-scale asset purchases, commonly referred to as Quantitative Easing (QE). Since 
late 2008 the US Federal Reserve has increased its balance sheet by nearly $4 trillion through a 
series of large-scale asset purchase programs; in April 2013 the Bank of Japan announced it 
would purchase JGBs worth about 50 trillion yen for two years, as part of its qualitative and 
quantitative easing (QQE) program; and in January 2015 the ECB launched an asset purchase 
program worth €1.1 trillion. In the United Kingdom, which is the focus of this paper, the Bank of 
England first announced that it would buy £75 billion of financial assets through the creation of 
central bank reserves in March 2009.  This purchase program was subsequently expanded over 
time and when the first phase of purchases had been completed in January 2010 (QE1), the Bank 
had purchased a cumulative total of £200 billion of assets, comprising almost exclusively 
medium to long-term UK government bonds (gilts).  A further phase of gilt purchases (QE2), 
from October 2011 to October 2012, resulted in the program being expanded to a cumulative 
total of £375 billion, an amount equivalent to nearly 25% of annual nominal GDP. 
While the objectives of the QE policy have been clear in terms of helping central banks 
achieve their mandated price inflation objectives, there has been more debate about how the 
policy was expected to work, with a number of potential channels being discussed.  However, 
policy makers in both the US (Bernanke, 2010; Yellen, 2011) and the UK (Bean, 2011) have 
emphasized the portfolio balance channel, which goes back to the work of Tobin and others in 
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the 1960s, as a key element in the expected transmission of asset purchases to the rest of the 
economy.  According to this mechanism, purchases of financial assets financed by central bank 
money increase liquidity and push up asset prices, as those who have sold assets rebalance their 
portfolios into riskier assets.  This stimulates expenditure by increasing wealth and lowering 
borrowing costs for households and companies.  However, the importance of this channel has 
been disputed from a modern theoretical perspective (Woodford, 2012).  Moreover, most 
empirical research has inferred the importance of this channel indirectly from the behavior of 
government bond prices/yields and other asset prices (Joyce et al., 2011; Gagnon et al., 2011; 
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011; D’Amico et al., 2012). There has been less 
research assessing the direct impact of QE on the investment behavior of financial institutions. 
The contribution of this paper is to address this gap in the literature by assessing the 
effect of asset purchases by the Bank of England on the portfolio allocation decisions of large 
institutional investors, specifically UK insurance companies and pension funds (ICPFs).  ICPFs 
are major participants in UK financial markets and the group of institutions who the Bank of 
England specifically targeted through their purchases (Joyce, Tong and Woods, 2011).  In terms 
of related work, Carpenter et al (2015) model US aggregate flow of funds data over the crisis, 
but their paper does not address the potential correlation between asset purchases and the other 
financial control variables included in their analysis, nor do they examine micro-level data on 
individual institutions. For the UK, Goodhart and Ashworth (2012) examine trends in the 
national accounts data on net investment behavior by ICPFs, but they do not attempt to model 
the portfolio behavior of ICPFs to provide a counterfactual.1  
If QE works through a portfolio balance channel, we would expect ICPFs to have 
reduced their gilt holdings below what they would otherwise have been, and to have increased 
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their demand for riskier assets.  In attempting to answer whether this occurred, we need to model 
the institutions’ investment behavior, in order to generate a plausible counterfactual.  In doing so, 
we follow Pesaran and Smith (2012) and allow only for factors that influence portfolio allocation 
but at the same time are unaffected by the Bank’s QE purchases.  The aggregate data allow us to 
model the effects of QE on the net investment of ICPFs and other investors across different asset 
classes, enabling us to estimate which sectors sold gilts to the Bank in response to QE and where 
they reinvested the proceeds.  In addition, we also use regulatory data on the asset holdings of 
the individual institutions themselves to cross check this analysis and to examine the extent to 
which there may have been heterogeneities across different institutions.  Our results suggest QE 
led to institutional investors shifting their portfolios away from government bonds towards 
corporate bonds.  But portfolio rebalancing seems to have been limited to corporate bonds and 
did not extend to equities. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows.  In Section 2 we discuss some of the 
previous literature on portfolio balance effects and draw out the possible implications for the 
behavior of institutional investors.  Section 3 describes the main data sources we use and some of 
their limitations, as well as some summary statistics on ICPF net investment flows and asset 
holdings.  In Section 4 we set out our empirical methodology, which includes estimating models 
for portfolio investment and asset allocation, as well as constructing counterfactuals.  Section 5 
goes on to discuss the evidence from the national accounts data on ICPFs.  Sections 6 then 
explores the micro evidence on the portfolio behavior of life insurance companies and defined 
benefit pension funds.  Section 7 sets out our main conclusions.  
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2. THE PORTFOLIO BALANCE CHANNEL AND INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 
 
There are a number of channels through which QE might be expected to affect the macro-
economy, including policy signaling, portfolio rebalancing and liquidity effects, although 
monetary policy makers have placed particular emphasis on the portfolio balance channel. This 
channel is particularly associated with the work of Tobin (1963), who demonstrated how changes 
in asset supplies lead to changes in financial asset prices when there is imperfect substitutability 
between financial assets, but similar ideas were also developed by others, including Friedman 
and Schwartz (1963) and Brunner and Meltzer (1973).  The portfolio balance channel provides a 
means for central bank asset purchases to affect the real economy.  By purchasing assets from 
the non-bank private sector in return for central bank reserves, QE increases the sellers’ broad 
money holding.  If money is seen as an imperfect substitute for the assets being purchased, the 
sellers will then seek to rebalance their portfolios by buying other assets, which may be riskier 
(like corporate bonds rather than gilts). The sellers of these assets will in turn want to rebalance 
their portfolios.  During this process of rebalancing, asset prices will rise until investors are 
indifferent to the overall supplies of money and financial assets. Higher asset prices, or 
equivalently lower yields, may in turn be passed on into lower borrowing costs for households 
and firms and also increase the net wealth of asset holders, both of which should stimulate real 
activity and inflation.   
In modern macroeconomic models changes in asset quantities do not feed through into 
asset prices, either because assets are assumed to be perfect substitutes for one another or 
because of other assumptions which result in the private sector effectively consolidating the 
public sector balance sheet into its own.  The consequence is that policies like QE can only work 
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if they change the private sector’s expectations of future policy rates through the signaling 
channel, as transferring assets between the private and public sectors under QE has no effect in 
itself (Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003; Woodford, 2012).  Under less restrictive assumptions 
this QE neutrality result does not always hold, for example with ‘preferred-habitat’ theories 
(Culbertson, 1957; Modigliani and Sutch, 1966), where investors have a preference for a 
particular segment of the yield curve.  Andres et al (2004) develop a DSGE model where two 
types of agent have different preferences for long-term bonds and show that it generates portfolio 
balance type effects.  Vayanos and Vila (2009) also develop a model with two types of agent: 
arbitragers (who are mean-variance optimizers) and preferred-habitat investors. They show that 
the supply of bonds can affect yields even in the presence of arbitrageurs, provided the latter are 
risk averse or capital constrained.  Central bank asset purchases in this model would affect yields 
both through a scarcity effect or ‘local supply effect’ concentrated (localized) in the bonds being 
purchased and through a more broad-based duration risk effect, which reflects the fact that 
reducing the bonds held by the private sector leads to a fall in the quantity of duration risk held 
by arbitrageurs, which in turn reduces the market price of duration risk and increases the price of 
all long-duration assets.   
The design of the Bank of England’s asset purchase program was targeted towards 
financial institutions like life insurance companies and pension funds, normally thought of as 
preferred habitat investors, given the regulatory pressures on them to purchase long-term assets 
in order to match their long-term liabilities (Fisher, 2010)2.  The transactions were conducted 
through reverse auctions via the gilt-edged market makers (GEMMs), but the ultimate sellers of 
government gilts were unknown (Joyce and Tong, 2012).3   
The aim of this paper is to identify the importance of ICPFs in selling gilts to the Bank of 
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England and to gauge the extent of any portfolio rebalancing by them into riskier assets by 
analyzing their portfolio allocation behavior during the period that QE purchases took place. 
More specifically, we attempt to answer the following three questions:   (1) Did a significant 
fraction of the Bank of England’s asset purchases come from ICPFs? (2) Did ICPFs increase 
their net investment in risky assets more than they would otherwise have done as a result of QE? 
(3) Did ICPFs increase their asset allocation towards risky assets more than they would 
otherwise have done as a result of QE? 
  An affirmative answer to the first question seems a necessary one for a QE portfolio 
rebalancing effect to have occurred. If the QE policy worked through a portfolio balance channel 
to any significant degree then a significant fraction of the purchases must have ultimately come 
from ICPFs.4 An affirmative answer to the second question also seems a necessary condition for 
a portfolio balancing channel to have worked. Although it is theoretically possible that any 
effects could come entirely through prices without any flow effects needing to occur, it seems 
more plausible that at least some adjustment in quantities would occur in practice and this is 
typically how portfolio rebalancing is described and for the most part understood. An affirmative 
answer to the third question would establish a broader portfolio effect and would seem a natural 
corollary of the workings of such a channel, but would not on its own be necessary or sufficient 
to establish the existence of a portfolio rebalancing channel. A difficulty of assessing the 
empirical evidence is that we need to allow for a variety of other factors that may have been 
influencing portfolio investments over the period: we need to judge the data in terms of a 
counterfactual of what would otherwise have happened.   
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3. DATA ON PORTFOLIO ALLOCATION 
3.1 Data sources 
Our analysis makes use of a range of data sources, including national accounts data on the flow 
of funds by sector, and micro-data on the portfolio allocations of individual pension funds and 
life insurance companies. The UK’s Office for National Statistics (ONS) publishes financial 
accounts data with the national accounts that report the net asset acquisition of financial assets 
(which we also refer to as net investment for brevity) by pension funds and insurance companies 
combined, as well as other sectors, including overseas investors and other financial institutions. 
The financial accounts data on ICPFs are available at a quarterly frequency from 1987-2012 and 
are obtained from a combination of sources, including a survey of 1,500 self-administered 
pension schemes and 300 insurance companies, but also data from other sources, such as central 
government and the Bank of England, in order to produce a balanced set of National Accounts. 
We also make use of two micro datasets on the asset allocations of individual life 
insurance companies and defined benefit (DB) pension schemes. These micro datasets are 
produced as a product of regulation, which requires that individual life insurance companies and 
DB pension schemes submit annual financial information to the relevant regulators documenting 
their asset allocations for risk assessment purposes.  In the case of insurance companies, the 
regulator is the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) (formerly the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA)5), and for DB pensions (since 2005) it is The Pensions Regulator. The dataset 
for life insurance companies is made publically available via SynThesys, and for DB pensions it 
is a proprietary dataset held by the UK’s Pension Protection Fund (PPF).  
The SynThesys Life data cover over 350 life insurance companies that were in existence 
for at least one year (and therefore filed returns) from 1985-2012. In 1985 there were 229 
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insurance companies filing returns, but by 2012 this had fallen to just over 100.6 For each 
company the data provide annual information on the percentage of total assets7 held across a 
number of broad asset categories. In addition, the data provide information on a number of 
insurance firm-level characteristics, including firm size (measured by total admissible assets), the 
free asset ratio (the ratio of excess capital resources available to cover long-term business Capital 
Resource Requirements (CRR) against total assets); the ratio of business premiums to assets; and 
the proportion of the assets held to match linked liabilities. 
The pension fund data relate to the universe of defined benefit pension funds for which 
the PPF are responsible. In 2012 this consisted of 6,316 DB schemes, covering 11.7 million 
members.8 Although the PPF data made available to us were compiled in 2012, the underlying 
asset allocation data were often one or two years older. For most of the funds, their latest asset 
breakdown dates are prior to 2011. Moreover, the asset breakdown dates are different for 
different pension funds, so we adjusted the original dataset by interpolating to obtain asset 
allocations at the same time each year.9  The adjusted asset allocation dataset used in our analysis 
consists of year-end data from 2005 to 2010.  For each pension fund, we have annual data on the 
percentage of total assets held across a number of broad asset categories. The data also provide 
information on pension fund size (in terms of either the size of liabilities or number of scheme 
members); fund maturity (measured by either the percentage of retired members or the average 
age of scheme members); the amount of the risk-based levy (RBL) paid by the scheme to the 
PPF, which is mainly determined by sponsor insolvency risk and scheme underfunding risk; and 
the funding position, measured by the funding ratio (i.e. value of assets as a percentage of 
liabilities).10   
Combining these datasets we are therefore able to examine the portfolio behavior of 
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ICPFs at both an aggregate level (net investment flows) and at the level of individual 
funds/companies (asset shares).  Although some of the datasets provide quite a rich breakdown 
of assets, for most of our analysis we will concentrate on four broad categories: equities, 
government bonds (split into nominal and index linked where possible), corporate bonds 
(combining UK and foreign bonds) and cash (including bank deposits and other short-term 
assets).  The amounts allocated to property/land and other assets are relatively small and are 
therefore excluded from our analysis.   
3.2 Recent trends  
Figure 1A derived from ONS financial accounts data shows the quarterly cumulative net 
acquisition of gilts by different investor categories over the period from 2001.  It can be seen that 
the Bank of England was a significant net purchaser of gilts.  Over the same period, Monetary 
Financial Institutions (Other MFIs) also increased their net investment in gilts, as did the 
overseas sector (RoW).  But, as Figure 1A shows, ICPF’s net purchases of gilts were relatively 
small, which could be consistent with them selling gilts to the Bank of England.   
The unusual behavior of ICPFs is brought out in Figure 1B, which shows the difference 
between the cumulative sectoral net acquisition of gilts in Figure 1A and what would have been 
implied if net acquisitions had grown in line with the share of each sector in total net issuance 
during 2001-2008.  Figure 1B suggests that there was a significant decline in ICPF’s net 
investment in gilts compared with what might have been expected.  This is also true for the 
overseas sector. 
Table 1 reports some summary statistics for quarterly net ICPF investment flows and the 
annual asset allocations by life companies and pension funds across the main asset classes for 
each of the datasets we examine.11  Over the sample as a whole, ICPFs have been disinvesting 
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from equities and increasing their net investment in gilts, corporate bonds and cash, with 
corporate bonds being the fastest growing sector.  However, the largest asset holdings of life 
insurers have been in equities and nominal gilts, which have both accounted for about 30% of 
their total assets on average.  For life companies corporate bonds and cash have made up about 
20% of their total assets on average.  In the case of pension funds, equities have taken up more 
than 50% of their total assets on average, with nominal gilts, index-linked gilts and corporate 
bonds accounting for 15 to 20% each and cash a smaller share of less than 10%.12 
4. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY: MODELLING PORTFOLIO ALLOCATION 
  
Institutional investors face the same optimization problem as any other investor of investing a 
given amount of money to maximize utility subject to some budget constraints, but are subject to 
a larger array of complicating factors due to the liabilities that the institution must honor 
(Dinenis and Scott, 1993); for example, long-term assets may have to be matched to long-term 
liabilities.   Institutional investor asset allocation decisions may be further complicated by the 
need to reflect the risk preferences of several groups, including (sometimes multiple) asset 
managers (Blake et al., 2013), trustees and pensioners, and so may be nonstandard (McCarthy 
and Miles, 2013).  Asset allocation may also be constrained by regulatory requirements (Amir, 
Guan, and Oswald, 2010).  Moreover, the dynamic behavior of these investors is complicated by 
the fact that, while typically shaping their portfolios in line with a strategic asset allocation 
approach that takes into account the characteristics of the institution and adopts a long-term view 
of an appropriate asset mix, they may deviate from these allocations in the short-term and engage 
in tactical asset allocation to take advantage of temporary changes in market conditions 
(Brennan, Schwartz and Lagnado, 1997).  
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For all these reasons, developing a structural model of institutional investor portfolio 
behavior is particularly challenging.  Here we adopt a simpler approach, which is informed by a 
recent paper by Pesaran and Smith (2012), who argue that it is not always necessary to estimate a 
fully structural model if the aim is to identify policy effects.  What is needed instead, they argue, 
is a conditional model with parameters that are invariant to the policy change.  In constructing 
such a conditional model of the effects of a policy variable on an outcome variable, they 
distinguish between control variables that may not be invariant to the policy variable and control 
variables that affect the outcome variable but are not affected by the policy variable.  They argue 
that only the latter type of control variable is relevant in evaluating the effects of the policy 
variable, since the former can be substituted out of the model provided there are enough lags of 
the other variables. 
Following Pesaran and Smith (2012), we adopt a reduced-form approach incorporating 
the variables that we view as independent of the policy variable. We take these variables to 
include debt issuance by the DMO,13 foreign financial variables and (where available) the 
individual characteristics of specific institutions to allow for the nature of their liabilities and the 
regulatory and other constraints they face.  We experimented with including domestic 
macroeconomic controls, but their inclusion induces potential endogeneity and may lead to QE 
policy effects being under-estimated. As a practical matter, when they were included we found 
that they were typically statistically insignificant.  To explain net investment in different asset 
classes at the sectoral level, we estimate the following regression model:  
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑗𝑡
𝑘 =  𝛼𝑗
𝑘 +  𝜋𝑗
𝑘𝑄𝐸 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾𝑗1
𝑘 𝐷𝑀𝑂 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡 
+𝛾𝑗2
𝑘 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽𝑗
𝑘𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑗𝑡−1
𝑘 + 𝜖𝑗𝑡
𝑘                    (1) 
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The dependent variable in the regression, 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑗𝑡
𝑘 , is the net acquisition (measured in £ million) 
of any asset class k by sector j in quarter t.  Regressors include the QE policy 
variable, 𝑄𝐸 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑡, which is measured by the amount of gilt purchases (in £ million),
14 
and as controls we include net issuance of gilts, 𝐷𝑀𝑂 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡, and foreign financial variables 
to account for exogenous financial conditions which are independent of the Bank of England’s 
QE policy.  The foreign financial controls include the change in the 10-year benchmark US 
Treasury yield (∆𝑈𝑆 𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑); the change in the US 10-year corporate spread 
(∆𝑈𝑆 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑝 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑), which is the difference between the Barclays US high yield index and the 
10-year US Treasury yield; the return on the S&P 500 (𝑈𝑆 𝑆&𝑃 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠) and its realized 
volatility (𝑈𝑆 𝑆&𝑃 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦), a measure of uncertainty.15,16  In addition, we also include the 
lagged dependent variable as a regressor to allow for some inertia in the adjustment process.17   
This equation is similar to the specification used in Carpenter et al (2015) to examine US 
flow of funds data, but differs in that we use net investment rather than changes in asset stocks, 
so this regression looks at the determinants of net flows into different assets.  As revaluation 
effects would be expected to represent only a small fraction of each quarter’s net flows, these 
regressions enable us to examine the institutions’ active portfolio decision making.  
We also investigate the impact of QE purchases on portfolio allocation using data on 
individual insurance companies and pension funds.  For life companies and pension funds 
separately, we estimate the following panel regression: 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡
𝑘 = 𝛼𝑘 + 𝜋𝑘𝑄𝐸 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾1
𝑘𝐷𝑀𝑂 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡 
+ 𝛾2
𝑘𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾3
𝑘𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽
𝑘𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑘 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡
𝑘     (2)  
where 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡
𝑘  is the percentage of any asset class k that a life insurance company/pension fund i 
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holds in period t, and 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡  are company or fund i specific characteristics. As in 
equation (1), 𝑄𝐸 𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑡 is the quantity of QE purchases
18, 𝐷𝑀𝑂 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡
19 and Financial 
Controls are as previously defined. 
It is important to acknowledge that there are some factors that may also have affected the 
portfolio allocation of institutional investors, which we do not explicitly consider in our 
modelling approach.  These include expected regulatory and accounting changes at the 
international level (such as the EU-wide insurance regulations (Solvency II) and changes to 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)) and also national level regulations (such as 
the PRA’s regulatory requirements under the Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process 
(ICAAP), Individual Capital Adequacy Standards (ICAS), and the Pension Act 2004).   It is 
extremely difficult to account for the impact of these factors directly due to the fact that changes 
in regulation and accounting rules often take a long time to implement and institutional investors 
might change their investment strategies well ahead of implementation. However, the impact of 
these factors may be captured indirectly by the control variables and lagged dependent variables 
included in the regressions.  
Following Pesaran and Smith (2012), we construct an ex-post counterfactual comparison 
of the QE impact. This is calculated as the difference between the realized outcomes which 
includes the QE policy and a no-QE policy counterfactual scenario, where the counterfactual is 
based on the net investment model in equation (1) (excluding QE purchases) estimated using the 
sub-sample which ends just before the beginning of QE.  More formally, this is calculated as:  
𝑄𝐸_𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡(𝑒𝑥 − 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡)𝑇+ℎ = 𝑦𝑇+ℎ − 𝐸(𝑦𝑇+ℎ|𝑦𝑇 , 𝑄𝐸𝑇+ℎ
0 , 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑇+ℎ, 𝛺𝑠𝑢𝑏) (3) 
 
where the expectation of the outcome variable 𝑦𝑇+ℎ is the linear projection from the model 
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estimated in equation (1), and where QET+h
0 = 0 is the policy variable assuming there was no 
QE, and Ωsub is the parameter set based on the sub-sample estimation up to the end of 2008.
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5. SECTORAL RESULTS 
 
The OLS regression results from estimating equation (1) for the net acquisition of gilts across 
investor types are reported in Table 2. The table shows that for ICPFs the coefficient on the Bank 
of England’s net purchases of gilts variable (QE Purchases) is statistically significantly with a 
negative sign. Its value implies that for every £1 of gilts purchased by the Bank, ICPFs reduced 
their net inflows into government bonds by about twelve pence (£0.12).  Since the coefficient on 
the lagged dependent variable in the regression is statistically significant and positive, we also 
report the long-run coefficient on QE purchases, which is estimated to be 0.18 in absolute terms, 
suggesting that the impact increases over time.    
From Table 2 we can see that QE purchases are also negative and statistically significant 
for three other sectors – OFIs (other financial institutions), MFIs (monetary financial institutions 
including banks) and RoW (rest of the world).  This is consistent with investors in each of these 
sectors reducing their net acquisition of gilts in response to the amount of QE purchases.  On the 
whole, the lagged dependent variables for these sectors are either small or statistically 
insignificant from zero, so the long-run effects reported are only slightly different.  Although we 
do not impose any adding-up constraints, the sum of the coefficients on the QE purchases 
variable across investor types is close to unity for both the short-run and long-run effects, as we 
would expect.  Finally, the coefficient on the DMO variable, measuring the quarterly issuance of 
government debt, is positive and statistically significant for each of these same investor sectors, 
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as expected.   
The OFI sector includes the gilt-edged market makers (GEMMs), and since the 
mechanics of the QE program involved the Bank of England buying from the GEMMs, we 
would expect to see a large negative short-run coefficient on the QE purchase variable for this 
category of investors, which is what we observe.  While the long-run effect for this sector is 
similar to the short-run impact, this should probably not be taken as meaning that OFIs were the 
ultimate sellers, as the dynamics are likely to be more complicated than our models allow.  For 
example, it seems likely that a lot of the gilts sold by OFIs will have been originally sourced 
from ICPFs, so the long-run impact probably exaggerates the importance of OFIs as ultimate 
sellers and understates that of ICPFs.21   Taking the results at face value, the long-run estimates 
suggest that, of the £375 billion of total QE, around £68 billion (nearly a fifth) originated from 
ICPFs.  Although probably an underestimate, this still suggests that a significant amount of the 
Bank’s purchases came from institutional investors. The results in Table 2 are based on using the 
full data sample from 1987Q1 to 2012Q4.  To check the results are robust to excluding the 
earlier part of the sample period from the 1980s and 1990s, the memo item reported in the table 
shows the QE parameter estimates when the estimation sample is restricted to the period from 
the beginning of 2000Q1.  The main results are essentially unchanged, with the coefficient in the 
ICPF equation slightly larger. 22   
Table 3 compares regression results for the net investment flows of ICPFs into four broad 
asset categories: government index-linked and nominal bonds (as before), equities, corporate 
bonds and cash. As well as the significant negative coefficient on QE purchases in the gilts 
equation (repeated from Table 2), there is also a significantly positive coefficient on the QE 
variable in the corporate bonds equation.  This is consistent with a portfolio rebalancing effect, 
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with the coefficient suggesting that £1 of QE leads to ICPFs increasing their long-run flows into 
corporate bonds by about 30 pence.  This would imply that for £375 billion of QE purchases, 
ICPFs increased their net investment in corporate bonds by £117 billion (=£375 x 0.312). To set 
this in a broader macro context, this is about twice the size of the average amount of annual gross 
corporate bond issuance in the UK during 2003-08 (according to Dealogic figures), which 
suggests that the estimated effects from rebalancing are economically significant. 
To examine the robustness of these findings to the choice of sample, the first memo item 
in Table 3 shows the results from re-estimating the equation over a shorter sample from 2000Q1. 
Again the results are very similar, showing evidence of portfolio rebalancing from gilts to 
corporate bonds.  The second memo item is from a different specification, which splits QE 
expenditures between the first phase of purchases from March 2009 to January 2010 (QE1) and 
from October 2011 to October 2012 (QE2).  The coefficients on the two QE policy variables 
reported for the gilts equation and for the corporate bonds equation are of similar size and 
significance, with the differences not statistically significant according to a standard F-test.  
In Figure 2 we evaluate the ex-post impact of QE as described in equation (3).  Figure 2 
shows the actual and no-QE counterfactuals for ICPF net investment into each asset class, 
derived by forecasting from a regression estimated up to the period before QE began using the 
financial accounts sectoral data.  We can see that for government bonds, the ex-post QE effects 
after the start of the QE program in 2009 are mostly negative, implying that the expected value 
of investment flows into government bonds would have been higher without QE.  This is 
consistent with our earlier findings that ICPFs were net sellers of government bonds after the 
introduction of the QE program. In contrast, the net flows into corporate bonds are positive, 
suggesting that net investment into corporate bonds was higher than would have been expected 
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in the absence of QE.  The chart also suggests that in the absence of QE net inflows into equities 
and cash would have been higher on average, although there is substantial volatility from quarter 
to quarter. 
 
6. MICRO-LEVEL RESULTS FOR INSURERS AND PENSION FUNDS 
 
In this section we report estimates for the dynamic panel models described in equation (2) for life 
insurers (at the parent company level) and for pension funds.  Table 4 reports the results for life 
insurers based on Arellano-Bond estimation, which allows for the presence of a lagged 
dependent variable, using the annual financial information provided by the SynThesys database 
from 1985-2012.  In addition to the financial controls used previously, the regressions also 
include individual controls relating to the characteristics of the insurance fund, including: firm 
size, which enters as the log change in total admissible assets; the free asset ratio; the ratio of 
business premiums to assets; and the fraction of assets linked to liabilities.  In interpreting the 
results, it should be borne in mind that, as described in Table 1, the SynThesys data for nominal 
and index-linked government bonds include both UK and overseas government bonds, although 
it seems very likely that UK government bonds dominate.  Note also that the data we use for 
equities and corporate bonds combine UK and overseas securities and that cash includes cash in 
hand and deposits.    
The coefficient on the QE purchases variable (QE Purchases) in the second column 
relates to the effect of the QE program on asset allocation to nominal government bonds.  The 
estimated value of this coefficient should be interpreted as -0.01721%.  Using the 2012 figure for 
total life insurer assets, this would imply that £375 billion of QE purchases reduced the value of 
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life insurers’ holdings of nominal gilts by around £48 billion.23  The estimates in Table 4 also 
suggest that the QE impact on the allocation to index-linked government bonds and equities was 
negative, but there was a positive impact on the asset allocation towards corporate bonds. 
To examine the robustness of these findings to the sample, the first memo item in Table 5 
shows the results from re-estimating the equation over a much shorter sample from 2005Q1. 
Since we lose many degrees of freedom from this, the number of financial controls was reduced 
to just the first difference of the US long yield, but all the firm characteristic controls were 
retained. Perhaps not surprisingly the statistical significance of the QE variable in these 
regressions is somewhat reduced, but again the results show evidence of portfolio rebalancing 
from gilts to corporate bonds, with a negative QE coefficient in nominal gilts equation and a 
positive QE coefficient in the corporate bond equation.  The second memo item reports the 
parameter estimates for the QE impact on insurers when we separate out the impact of QE1 and 
QE2.  It can be seen that the impact from QE on the allocation to nominal bonds is slightly larger 
and more statistically significant for QE2, while the impact on the allocation to corporate bonds 
has a similar size and statistical significance for both QE1 and QE2.  
Turning to the panel regression analysis for defined benefit pension schemes, we 
estimated the dynamic panel model in equation (2) using the annual data provided to us by the 
Pension Protection Fund for the years 2005-2010.  The results from this analysis are presented in 
Table 5.  The models estimated include only one financial control variable (the change in US 
Treasury yields) given the short sample size,24 but various fund-specific controls.  These controls 
include: the size of the pension scheme measured by the log of the number of members; the 
maturity of the scheme, measured by the ratio of pensioners in payment to the total number of 
members in the scheme including active and deferred; the size of the Risk-Based Levy (RBL), 
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the annual premium that the fund has to pay to the PPF; and the funding ratio, measured by the 
value of assets as a percentage of liabilities.25    In interpreting the results, note that, as described 
in Table 1, the PPF data for nominal and index-linked government bonds include both the UK 
and overseas government bonds, though the former is likely to dominate.  Note also that equities 
and corporate bonds include both UK and overseas securities and that cash includes cash in hand 
and deposits.    
From the results in Table 5, it can be seen that the allocation to nominal government 
bonds is estimated to have fallen in response to QE. The change in the portfolio share of pension 
funds’ holdings of nominal government bonds in response to £1 bn of QE is 0.00577%, which 
would suggest a reduction of around £22 bn over the whole QE period.26  We also see that QE is 
associated with an increased allocation to both index-linked and corporate bonds.  As with the 
life companies, these results are broadly consistent with the earlier sectoral dataset results. 
Comparing the results in Tables 4 and 5, pension funds unlike insurers appear to have increased 
their net investment in index-linked bonds.  One reason could be that, following the 1995 
Pension Act, DB pension funds have been required to index link pension entitlements and they 
may therefore have been buying index-linked securities to match their liabilities over the QE 
period. 
One unsatisfactory feature of the estimation results in Table 5 is the coefficient on the 
lagged dependent variable which exceeds unity for some asset classes, perhaps reflecting the 
short sample period used for the estimation.  To check robustness, we also estimated the same 
asset share equations in difference form using a fixed effects model.  As shown in the memo item 
in the table, both the responses of nominal gilts and corporate bonds to QE remain similar to the 
dynamic panel regression estimated in levels. 
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7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper we examined a range of data sources, including sectoral net investment data and 
micro-level data on individual life insurance companies and pension funds, in order to assess 
how the Bank of England’s QE policy in the aftermath of the global financial crisis affected the 
investment behavior of insurance companies and pension funds.  More specifically, we looked 
for evidence of the operation of the so-called 'portfolio balance channel' that has been 
emphasized by UK and US monetary policy makers as a key channel through which QE works. 
In answering the questions we posed in Section 2, our results suggest that a substantial 
fraction of the Bank of England’s QE gilt purchases came from institutional investors.  
Moreover, the balance of evidence from both the analysis of the sectoral data on net investment 
flows and the analysis of the micro-level data on portfolio shares was consistent with the 
hypothesis that the Bank of England’s QE policy resulted in some portfolio rebalancing behavior 
by institutional investors, who appear to have reduced their gilt holdings and shifted into riskier 
corporate bonds relative to the counterfactual.27  But it appears that portfolio rebalancing was 
limited to corporate bonds, with most of the evidence suggesting that institutional investors 
moved out of equities during the period of QE purchases.   
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1 The impact on portfolio allocation of more recent QE programmes in Japan and the Euro area is examined in Saito 
and Hogen (2014) and Koijen, Koulischer, Nguyen and Yogo (2016). 
2 As Fisher (2010) explains: “[t]he proposition is that, by buying gilts from pension funds and insurance companies 
(for example), those asset managers would have more cash in their portfolios than they desired, and would be 
incentivized to use that cash to invest in other, more risky instruments such as corporate bonds and equities.” 
3 When the Bank of England buys gilts in the open market it does so from the GEMMs, who act as the 
counterparties to these trades.  But the GEMMs are intermediaries, who would be expected to replenish their supply 
of gilts with purchases from other counterparties.   
4 It is possible that QE may also have led other agents to rebalance their portfolios, but central banks have 
emphasised the role of ICPFs, so it seems appropriate to focus on this group of investors.  Carpenter et al (2015) 
highlight the role of hedge funds in their analysis of portfolio rebalancing in response to the Federal Reserve’s large-
scale asset purchases.       
5 The FSA was responsible for the regulation of the financial services industry (including insurance companies) in 
the United Kingdom between 2001 and 2013. 
6 Over the full sample period the regulations governing the completion of these forms has changed, so that there may 
be structural breaks in some series. 
7 We obtain these asset allocation data from the PRA/FSA returns Form 13. 
8 The ONS aggregate data include public sector pension funds and also defined contribution schemes, which are 
excluded from the PPF universe.  However, the PPF data include smaller private pension funds, which are not 
captured by the ONS data. 
9 Where necessary, we adjusted the original data by interpolating the share of assets in a linear fashion with 
reference to the asset breakdown dates.  We used this method to estimate the share of assets on 31 December of each 
year to be consistent with the analysis in the PPF’s Purple Book. 
10 Assets are valued at market values, and the liabilities are based on the s179 valuation. For the latest s179 valuation 
guidance, see 
http://www.pensionprotectionfund.org.uk/DocumentLibrary/Documents/Section_179_Assumptions_Guidance_VA6
_Apr11.pdf 
11 Given that the different datasets often have different ways of grouping assets, it is not possible to work on exactly 
the same asset classification for different datasets. Table 1 explains the asset classification for each dataset. 
12 Amir, Guan and Oswald (2010) suggest that UK pension funds moved out of equities into bonds as a response to 
the new accounting standard FRS17 introduced in transitional form from 2001.  Jackson and Tonks (2014) report 
that UK life insurers shifted their asset allocations from equities to bonds following the FSA Tyner reforms of the  
risk-based regulatory regime for life insurers from 2005.  
13 The UK Government gave an explicit commitment at the start of the QE programme not to alter its issuance 
strategy as a result of the asset transactions undertaken by the Bank of England for monetary policy purposes (see 
the letter from the Chancellor to the Governor of the Bank of England, 3 March 2009, 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetarypolicy/Documents/pdf/chancellorletter050309.pdf).  Given this, and the 
fact that debt issuance plans are generally set on an annual cycle, it is not obvious that they would be explained even 
indirectly within the same quarter or year by plans for QE purchases.     
14 Our regression specifications all use the contemporaneous amount of asset purchases, rather than the expected 
amount. Unfortunately, we do not have comprehensive dataset on expectations of future purchases. We 
experimented with the inclusion of the stock of announced purchases but this made very little difference to any of 
the results, as the Bank of England announced its planned future purchases only 3 or 4 months ahead.  These results 
are available on request from the authors. 
15 The returns and realised volatilities are calculated for either 3 months or one year depending on the frequency of 
the data used.   
16 All the original financial market data used to derive these variables were sourced from Datastream.   
17 When this equation is estimated across each asset class for a given sector, or across all sectors for a given asset 
class, it becomes possible in principle to impose adding-up constraints for the system as whole.  The parameter 
estimates we report later are freely estimated and do not impose these restrictions, but we find that the data are in 
any case quite close to satisfying them.  
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18 We scale up the QE purchase units from £ million in equation (1) to £ billion in equation (2) for ease of reporting.  
19 Because of the long time series, we scale DMO debt issuance by nominal GDP for the SynThesys (the micro-level 
data for life insurance companies) data regressions. 
20 We also calculated the ex-ante impact of QE based on the expected difference between the QE policy scenario and 
a no-QE policy scenario, where both scenarios are based on the estimated model in (1) over the full sample.  These 
results are similar to those based on the ex post measure and are therefore not reported. 
21 That said, given the greater liquidity in the market as a result of the Bank’s presence and the higher balance sheet 
costs, it is possible that the GEMMs might have been encouraged to hold lower gilt inventories during the QE 
period, though it is less clear that any effect would have been permanent.   
22 The main results reported in this section are also robust to other specifications, using lags of QE spending, or 
separating out the first and second waves of QE purchases.  
23 This estimate is derived from 0.01721% * 1,292 * 0.58 * 375 = £48.4 billion, where £1,292 billion is the total 
assets of all the life insurers who invested in gilts in 2012, according to SynThesys.  The asset share percentages are 
not share percentages against total admissible assets; they are shares against the subtotal, which excludes assets held 
to match linked liabilities. So 0.58 is the ratio of the assets not linked to liabilities (i.e. the subtotal) against total 
admissible assets.  The total amount of QE is £375 billion. 
24 When this control is excluded the main change is that the QE purchase variable becomes positive and statistically 
significant in the equity share equation.  The full results are available on request.  
25 The funding ratio variable shows the extent to which the scheme is adequately funded; if substantially 
underfunded, the Pensions Regulator may require the scheme sponsor to make additional contributions into the 
scheme to reduce the deficit (Rauh, 2006; Liu and Tonks, 2013). 
26 This estimate is derived from 0.00577% * 1,026.80 *375 = £22.2 bn, where £1,026.80bn is the total assets of all 
DB pension funds as reported in the PPF’s 2012 Purple Book and £375bn is the total amount of QE.  
27 Additional analysis not reported here (but available on request from the authors) suggests that, although there is 
some evidence of different behaviour according to firm and fund characteristics, this switch was remarkably similar 
across different insurance companies and pension funds.   
 
 
 
 TABLE 1 
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR KEY VARIABLES 
Variable name Description of asset class Statistics for Full Sample 
Net acquisition of assets by 
ICPFs, quarterly (£ millions), 
1987Q1-2012Q4 
 No. obs Mean* Std 
Dev 
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝐼𝐶𝑃𝐹
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
 Quoted and unquoted UK shares, share and other equity issued by the rest of world, and 
mutual funds’ shares.  
104 -52.8 5621.6 
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝐼𝐶𝑃𝐹
𝐺𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑠 Government bonds of 1+ year maturity (nominal and index linked) issued by UK central 
government.  
104 1429.9 4605.5 
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝐼𝐶𝑃𝐹
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑠
 Corporate bonds of 1+ year maturity (local and foreign currencies) issued by UK residents 
and the rest of world.  
104 4613.9 4281.5 
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝐼𝐶𝑃𝐹
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ  Cash includes currency and deposits.  104 1297.4 3724.4 
Asset allocation by life 
insurance companies (IC), 
annual (%), 1985-2012 
Denominator is total assets of parent IC (excluding assets held to match linked liabilities)    
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐼𝐶
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
 Share of equities, and other equity investments.  2,660 31.7 23.0 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐼𝐶
𝑁𝑜𝑚𝐺𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑠  Share of approved fixed interest securities, typically government nominal bonds, including 
both UK and other governments (mainly UK government bonds). 
3,008 29.6 19.9 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐼𝐶
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝐺𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑠  Share of approved variable interest securities, typically government index-linked bonds, 
including those issued by UK and other governments (mainly UK government bonds). 
1,458 3.2 7.2 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐼𝐶
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑠
 Share of fixed and variable interest securities, typically corporate bonds (including UK and 
overseas corporate bonds). 
2,442 19.3 19.6 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐼𝐶
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ  Share of cash in hand and deposits 3,438 20.6 27.3 
Asset allocation by pension 
funds (PF) annual (%), 2005-
2010 
Denominator is total assets of PF    
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑃𝐹
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
 Share of UK and overseas equities, excluding unquoted equities  21,386 57.4 19.4 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑃𝐹
𝑁𝑜𝑚𝐺𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑠  Share of UK and other governments fixed interest bonds. 11,775 16.3 13.8 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑃𝐹
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝐺𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑠  Share of variable interest securities, typically UK index-linked gilts. 9,132 15.6 15.1 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑃𝐹
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑠
 Share of fixed interest bonds issued by corporate sectors (in both the UK and overseas). 13,149 20.0 15.1 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑃𝐹
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ  Share of cash in hand and deposits. 15,125 7.9 14.7 
NOTES: * The mean portfolio shares of life insurers and pension funds do not sum to 100 because of different sample sizes. 
 TABLE 2 
NET ACQUISITION OF GOVERNMENT BONDS, SECTORAL REGRESSIONS; SAMPLE 1987Q1-2012Q4 
 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝐼𝐶𝑃𝐹𝑠
𝐺𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑠  𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑃𝑁𝐹𝐶𝑠
𝐺𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑠  𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑃𝐶𝑠
𝐺𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑠 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑠
𝐺𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑠 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝐻𝐻𝑠
𝐺𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑠 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑅𝑜𝑊
𝐺𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑠 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑀𝐹𝐼𝑠
𝐺𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑠 
QE purchases -0.118*** 0.001 -0.001 -0.445*** 0.007 -0.174** -0.250*** 
 (2.87) (0.64) (0.66) (8.13) (0.32) (2.41) (5.82) 
DMO issuance 0.104** 0.002 0.001 0.257*** -0.012 0.332*** 0.267*** 
 (2.51) (0.81) (0.39) (4.77) (0.74) (6.47) (5.88) 
∆US long yield 0.105 -0.002 0.043 -1.380 -0.498 1.406* 0.599 
 
 (0.13) (0.04) (1.17) (1.35) (0.87) (1.94) (0.79) 
∆US corp spread -0.381 -0.018 0.023*** 0.773* -0.184 0.087 0.109 
 (0.94) (0.86) (2.83) (1.73) (0.70) (0.22) (0.37) 
US S&P returns 24.550 -1.104 1.097* -22.280 -6.382 15.832 -6.040 
 (1.46) (0.79) (1.96) (1.07) (0.70) (0.94) (0.46) 
US S&P Volatility -8.282 -1.489 3.722 54.957 20.925 -85.995 52.510 
 (0.15) (0.49) (1.47) (0.73) (0.57) (0.93) (0.98) 
Lagged Dep. Var. 0.347*** 0.003 0.194*** -0.026 0.300** 0.130* 0.089 
 (3.21) (0.04) (2.88) (0.42) (2.07) (1.68) (0.86) 
Constant 393.309 16.963 -66.725 -456.028 -451.452 1,814.521 -1,929.502* 
 (0.32) (0.26) (1.06) (0.35) (0.62) (1.00) (1.95) 
Long-run impact -0.180 0.001 -0.001 -0.434 0.010 -0.199 -0.274 
Observations 103 103 103 103 103 103 103 
R-squared 0.313 0.029 0.067 0.677 0.121 0.491 0.51 
Memo item: Parameter estimates over sample 2000Q1-2012Q4:   
QE purchases -0.132*** 0.002 -0.001 -0.410*** -0.015 -0.165** -0.266*** 
 (2.78) (0.72) (1.02) (6.96) (0.45) (2.14) (5.67) 
Notes: The table reports regression results for sectoral net investment in government bonds. T-statistics in 
absolute values are reported in brackets and are based on Newey West heteroskedasticity consistent standard 
errors, where 4 lags were chosen following the Newey-West (1994) plug-in procedure.  Significance level: ***1%; 
**5%; *10%.  The sectors reported are: ICPFs - insurance companies and pension funds; PNFCs - private non-
financial corporations; PCs - public corporations (excluding the Bank of England); OFIs - other financial institutions 
and financial auxiliaries, including gilt-edged market makers, mutual funds and hedge funds; RoW – rest of the 
world investors; MFIs - monetary financial institutions, such as banks and building societies. Data sources: ONS, 
Datastream. 
 
 
  
 3 
 
TABLE 3 
NET ACQUISITION OF DIFFERENT ASSET CLASSES, ICPFs REGRESSION RESULTS; SAMPLE 1987Q1-
2012Q4 
 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝐼𝐶𝑃𝐹
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝐼𝐶𝑃𝐹
𝐺𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑠 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝐼𝐶𝑃𝐹
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑠 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝐼𝐶𝑃𝐹
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 
QE purchases -0.089 -0.118*** 0.074** 0.040 
 (1.37) (2.87) (2.53) (0.81) 
DMO issuance -0.003 0.104** -0.066*** -0.063 
 (0.08) (2.51) (2.63) (1.65) 
∆US long yield -1.435 0.105 0.936* -0.926 
 
 (1.20) (0.13) (1.70) (1.26) 
∆US corp spread -0.400 -0.381 -0.247 -0.006 
 (0.87) (0.94) (1.17) (0.02) 
US S&P returns 6.425 24.550 1.555 -26.472** 
 (0.360) (1.46) (0.17) (2.39) 
US S&P Volatility -56.045 -8.282 1.691 -102.790 
 (-1.10) (-0.15) (0.05) (-2.28) 
Lagged Dep. Var. 0.340*** 0.347*** 0.762*** 0.004 
 (2.96) (3.21) (8.16) (0.03) 
Constant 1119.586 393.309 1513.481** 3567.726*** 
 (1.020) (0.320) (2.32) (3.56) 
Long-run impact -0.134 -0.180 0.312 0.040 
Observations 103 103 103 103 
R-squared 0.221 0.313 0.585 0.103 
Memo item I: Parameter estimates over sample 2000Q1-2012Q4:   
QE purchases -0.161** -0.132*** 0.086** 0.055 
 (2.49) (2.78) (2.32) (1.02) 
Memo item II: Parameter estimates for QE1 and QE2 over full sample 1987Q1-2012Q4:   
QE1 purchases -0.023 -0.100** 0.081** 0.082 
 (0.39) (2.19) (2.10) (1.45) 
QE2 purchases -0.149*** -0.136*** 0.068** 0.004 
 (3.14) (3.11) (2.25) (0.11) 
Notes:  The table reports regression results for ICPFs net investment into different asset classes. T-statistics in absolute values 
are based on Newey‐West heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors, where 4 lags were chosen following the Newey-West 
(1994) plug-in procedure.  Significance level: ***1%; **5%; *10%.  Data sources: ONS, Datastream. 
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TABLE 4 
ASSET ALLOCATION BY LIFE COMPANIES; REGRESSIONS RESULTS; SAMPLE 1985-2012 
 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐼𝐶
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐼𝐶
𝑁𝑜𝑚𝐺𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑠 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐼𝐶
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝐺𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑠 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐼𝐶
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑠
 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝐼𝐶
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 
QE purchases -0.017*** -0.017*** 0.001 0.028*** -0.008 
 (2.71) (2.66) (0.34) (5.51) (1.05) 
DMO issuance/GDP 20.520*** 15.596** 8.007** -13.318** -35.863*** 
 (2.75) (2.11) (2.50) (2.10) (3.52) 
Financial controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Lagged Dep. Var. 0.585*** 0.607*** 0.408*** 0.702*** 0.596*** 
 (20.2) (24.61) (12.55) (27.37) (24.00) 
Constant 17.581*** 7.837*** 1.605*** 6.837*** 9.122*** 
 (11.01) (5.98) (3.29) (6.08) (6.09) 
Observations 2,183 2,506 1,047 1,972 2,873 
Memo item I: Parameter estimates over sample 2005-2012 (Financial controls (1), Firm controls (5)-(8)) 
QE purchases 0.002 -0.010 0.005* 0.014** 0.002 
 (0.24) (1.48) (1.75) (2.37) (0.28) 
Memo item II: Parameter estimates when QE1 and QE2 purchases are separated over full sample 1985-2012 
QE1 purchases -0.016** -0.014* -0.003 0.028*** -0.008 
 (2.29) (1.93) (0.95) (4.86) (0.85) 
QE2 purchases -0.0154 -0.021** 0.008** 0.028*** -0.009 
 (1.57) (2.09) (2.06) (3.59) (0.70) 
Notes:  Dynamic panel model estimated using Arellano-Bond procedure. The DMO control variable is scaled by 
nominal GDP; the QE purchases variable is in units of £ billion. T-statistics in absolute values are shown in 
parentheses.  Significance level: ***1%; **5%; *10%.  Financial controls: (1) First difference of the US long yield; (2) 
First difference of US corporate spread; (3) US S&P return; (4) US S&P volatility. Firm controls: (5) Firm size 
(measured by total admissible assets); (6) Free asset ratio (the ratio of excess capital resources available to cover 
long-term business Capital Resource Requirements (CRR) against total assets); (7) Ratio of business premiums to 
assets; and (8) Proportion of the assets held to match linked liabilities.  Data sources: Synthesys, Datastream. 
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TABLE 5 
ASSET ALLOCATION BY PENSION FUNDS; REGRESSION RESULTS; SAMPLE 2005-2010 
 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑃𝐹
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑃𝐹
𝑁𝑜𝑚𝐺𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑠 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑃𝐹
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝐺𝑖𝑙𝑡𝑠 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑃𝐹
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑠
 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑃𝐹
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 
QE purchases -0.000 -0.006*** 0.003* 0.011*** -0.002 
 (0.06) (3.29) (1.89) (4.57) (0.82) 
DMO issuance 0.008*** -0.005* -0.019*** -0.013** -0.008*** 
 (2.78) (1.89) (4.84) (2.47) (2.86) 
Financial 
controls 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Lagged Dep. Var. 0.774*** 1.038*** 1.433*** 1.144*** 0.674** 
 (25.01) (22.00) (10.17) (11.61) (26.10) 
Constant 9.227** 2.010 -8.654 -8.842* -4.990 
 (2.44) (0.50) (1.63) (1.71) (1.28) 
Observations 13,891 6,017 4,513 6,694 8,402 
Memo item: Parameter estimates from model estimated on changes in asset allocation 
QE purchases -0.003* -0.004*** 0.001 0.009*** -0.004* 
 (2.22) (2.85) (0.85) (6.24) (1.88) 
Notes:  Dynamic panel model estimated using Arellano-Bond procedure. Units for the DMO control variable and 
for the Bank of England QE variable are £ billions.  T-statistics in absolute values are shown in parentheses.   
Significance level: ***1%; **5%; *10%.  Financial controls:  First difference of US long yield.  Fund controls:  (1) 
Fund size (number of members); (2) Maturity of scheme; (3) Risk-based levy; and (4) Funding ratio.  Data sources: 
PPF, Datastream. 
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Figure 1A. Cumulative net acquisitions of UK 
government bonds by investor category since 2001Q1 
(£ billion) 
 
 
 
Figure 1B. Cumulative net acquisitions of UK 
government bonds by investor category (£ billion) 
relative to amount implied assuming fixed 2001-08 
shares in net issuance  
 
Notes: The graph shows the time profile of the 
difference between the cumulative net acquisitions of 
gilts by sector shown in Figure 1A and the amount 
implied if net acquisitions of each sector had grown in 
line with the sector’s share of total net gilt issuance 
during 2001-2008. 
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Figure 2:  Ex-post impact of QE on ICPFs: financial accounts data (£ million) 
 
Notes: The graph shows the ex post counterfactuals and outturns for the net acquisition of equities, government 
bonds, corporate bonds and cash by ICPFs. The counterfactual was produced by estimating the portfolio balance 
equations in Table 3 on data up to the end of 2008Q4 and projecting forward on the basis of the control variables. 
 
 
 
 
